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Introduction 
Maintaining a reasonable standard of living after retirement is an 
important concern.  With the increased mobility of labor, more people 
are working in more than one country throughout their career.1  Many 
workers have undoubtedly benefited from increased opportunities made 
possible by having access to different employment markets around the 
world.  These increased opportunities have also created the possibility of 
double social security taxation and impediments to social security 
benefit entitlement.2  Recognizing the issue of benefits coordination for 
workers that split their career between two countries, many countries 
have entered into agreements allowing such workers to "totalize" their 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Sophie Nonnenmacher, International Labour Mobility in the Evolving Global 
Labour Market, in WORLD MIGRATION 33 (2008) ("[T]rade liberalization is generally said to 
increase outward labour migration in the short term . . . ."). 
 2. See infra Part I.C.1 (discussing the purposes of social security taxation 
agreements, including reducing the burden of double taxation). 
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benefits.3  The coordination of benefits is not as easy as it sounds.  
Countries may face significant challenges when it comes to 
coordination, as benefits contributions, entitlement, resources and even 
philosophies differ. 
The United States has not yet concluded a Social Security 
Totalization Agreement (SSTA) with Mexico.4  Although entering into 
an SSTA with Mexico presents unique challenges, these challenges are 
not insurmountable.  With the appropriate responses, the impediments to 
reaching a U.S.-Mexico SSTA can be overcome and both the United 
States and Mexico can derive substantial benefit from such an 
agreement. 
Part I of this Note will give an overview of the United States Social 
Security system, then examine Mexico’s current social security 
framework.  It will also provide a general overview of social security 
taxation agreements and the policy grounds behind creating such 
agreements. 
Part II of this Note will discuss commonly cited potential negative 
consequences of entering into an SSTA with Mexico.  It suggests those 
concerns can be addressed prior to entering into such an agreement.  
Part II will examine potential reforms to existing social security laws 
that could solve the problem of benefits being provided to individuals 
for the time they spent working without authorization.  It also suggests 
that the prospect of a totalization agreement with Mexico may be used to 
incentivize improvements in the Mexican social security system. 
Possible issues with data verification systems that can lead to erroneous 
benefit payments can be combated by conditioning an SSTA on 
strengthening Mexico’s data verification systems and increased 
independent verification by U.S. social security officials. 
Part III will then address and offer potential solutions to address the 
major issues that have prevented the conclusion of an SSTA with 
Mexico and permit net gains to be realized on both sides of the border.  
A U.S.-Mexico SSTA will motivate existing illegal workers to attain 
legal status.  It will also promote legal immigration to the United States 
from Mexico, which will benefit the U.S. social security system.  United 
States workers that spend part of their career in Mexico may also benefit 
                                                                                                                 
 3. See U.S. International Social Security Agreements, infra note 48 and 
accompanying text (listing the countries that have a Social Security Totalization Agreement 
(SSTA) with the United States). 
 4. See id. (noting that Mexico is not on that list).  
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from having their contributions "totalized."  Additionally, a U.S.-
Mexico totalization agreement will strengthen relations with Mexico and 
promote the most favoured nations principle, the national treatment 
principle and the transparency principle, which are all embodied in the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).5  An SSTA will also 
remove the inducement on Mexican workers to remain in the United 
States until their retirements benefits vest.  The United States will also 
realize economic benefits by virtue of a U.S.-Mexico SSTA. 
Finally, Part IV concludes by suggesting that a totalization 
agreement will lead to a more equitable result than the result under the 
current regime, because there will be an increased likelihood that a 
Mexican worker that contributes to the U.S. social security system will 
receive a return on his or her contribution. 
I.  Background 
A.  The U.S. Social Security System 
1.  Overview 
Social security benefits include Title II benefits, Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI), and Medicare benefits.6  Title II benefits consist 
of retirement benefits—the focus of this Note—disability benefits, and 
derivative and survivor benefits.7  Social security is paid out of a trust 
fund on the books of the Treasury called the "Federal Old-Age and 
Survivors Insurance Fund" (the Fund).8  The Fund consists of securities 
held by the Secretary of the Treasury.9  One of the primary objectives of 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See Preamble to NAFTA, NAFTA SECRETARIAT SECRÉTARIAT DE L’ALÉNA, 
SECRETARIADO DEL TLCAN, http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/en/view.aspx?x=343&mtpi 
ID=120 (last visited Jan. 3, 2011) (describing the principles and goals embodied in NAFTA) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 6. See The Official U.S. Government Site for People with Medicare, MEDICARE, 
http://www.medicare.gov/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2011) (explaining various aspects of 
Medicare) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); 
see also A Glossary of Social Security Terms, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/ 
glossary.htm#S (last visited Mar. 8, 2010) (defining Supplemental Security Income and Title 
II benefits) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).  
 7. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 401 (West 2004) (explaining the outline of the trust fund 
process for Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits). 
 8. 42 U.S.C.A. § 401(a) (West 2004). 
 9. Id. 
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the Fund is to help provide for the material needs of the elderly.10  It is 
administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA), which is an 
independent executive agency.11 
2.  Funding 
Social security is primarily funded by the payroll tax FICA (Federal 
Insurance Contributions Act).12  The tax is collected from employers, employees, 
and the self-employed.13  The tax rate on wages earned in 1990 or thereafter is 
6.2%.14  The basic idea is that contributions will fund the program’s current 
payments and any excess of contributions over payments, to the extent they exist, 
will be held in reserve.15  This system will continue to function as long as the 
contributions coming in are equal to or greater than the payments going out.  If, 
however, contributions are consistently below outgoing payments, the system is 
not sustainable.  Unfortunately, long-term projections reveal "[a]nnual cost will 
exceed tax income starting in 2017, at which time the annual gap will be covered 
with cash from redemptions of special obligations of the Treasury that make up 
the trust fund assets until these assets are exhausted in 2041."16  The primary 
reasons for the social security system’s limited viability are increases in life 
expectancy, low fertility rates, and the retirement of the baby-boomers.17 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY HANDBOOK 100.1 (Apr. 18, 2006) 
[hereinafter HANDBOOK], available at http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/handbook/ 
handbook.01/handbook-0100.html (explaining the purposes of social security) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 11. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 901(a) (West 1994) (establishing the SSA as an independent 
agency). 
 12. 42 U.S.C.A. § 401 (West 2004). 
 13. HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 136.1. 
 14. 26 U.S.C.A. § 3101(a) (West 2004). 
 15. See HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 141.1 (describing the trust funds available for 
benefits). 
 16. THE BD. OF TRS., FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL 
DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, THE 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE 
AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS II(A) (2008) 
[hereinafter 2008 ANNUAL REPORT], http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/TR/TR08/trTOC. 
html (last visited on April 22, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice). 
 17. See id. (discussing the long range financial status of the U.S. social security 
system). 
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3.  Entitlement 
An individual is entitled to old-age insurance benefits if he/she "(1) is 
a fully insured individual, (2) has attained age 62, and (3) has filed 
application for old-age insurance benefits . . . ."18  Under 42 U.S.C. § 414 a 
"fully insured individual" is any individual who has had: 
[N]ot less than:  (1) one quarter coverage (whenever acquired) for each 
year after 1950 (or, if later, the year he attained age 21)  and before the 
year in which he died or (if earlier) the year in which he attained age 62, 
except that in no case shall an individual be a fully insured individual 
unless he has at least 6 quarters of coverage; or 
(2) 40 quarters of coverage; or  
(3) in the case of an individual who died before 1951, 6 quarters of 
coverage . . . .19 
An individual that is not a U.S. citizen or national must also meet other 
criteria in order to qualify as a "fully insured individual" and thereby, for 
social security benefits.20 
B.  The Mexican Social Security System 
1.  Overview 
There have been significant changes in the Mexican social security 
system over the last two decades.  The Instituto Mexicano del Seguro 
Social, or the Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS), was founded in 
1944.21  It manages social security programs, including old-age, disability, 
and life insurance.22  After a failed attempt at privatization reform in 1992, 
the system was successfully reformed and privatized in 1997.23  Under the 
                                                                                                                 
 18. 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(a) (West 2004). 
 19. 42 U.S.C.A. § 414(a) (West 2004). 
 20. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 414(c) (West 2004) (listing other requirements); see also supra 
Part II.A.1 (discussing how illegal immigrants that later obtain legal status may be able to 
receive social security benefits for the time they worked illegally). 
 21. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY PRIVATIZATION:  EXPERIENCES 
ABROAD 59 (1999) [hereinafter EXPERIENCES ABROAD], available at http://www.cbo.gov/ 
ftpdocs/10xx/doc1065/ssabroad.pdf (examining a select portion of countries with social 
security systems different from America’s system, and analyzing their pros and cons). 
 22. See id. (discussing the history of Mexico’s social security system and its transition 
from a public system to a private system). 
 23. See id. (discussing Mexico’s current privatized social security system). 
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current system, workers choose from a number of private investment firms 
to administer contributions.24  The new system is regulated by the Comisión 
Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro, or the National Commission 
for the Pension System (CONSAR).25  The CONSAR sets and enforces 
standards relating to the Mexican social security system.26  However, many 
workers in Mexico are employed in the informal sector; they do not make 
contributions to the system and do not receive benefits.27  Approximately 
fifty-eight percent of the population lacks social security coverage.28 
2.  Funding 
From its inception, the Mexican social security system has been 
funded by contributions from workers, employers, and the government.29  
The worker contributes 1.125% of earnings to old age benefits and 0.625% 
for disability and survivor benefits.30  The employer contributes 5.15% of 
earnings to old age benefits and 1.75% to disability and survivor benefits.31  
The government contributes 0.225% of the worker’s salary to social 
insurance old age benefits and 0.125% to disability and survivor benefits.32  
The future of the system largely depends on the rate of return on private 
contributions.33  Workers that made contributions under the old state-run 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Id. at 64. 
 25. Id. at 68–69; see also Home Page to CONSAR, COMISÓN NACIONAL DEL SISTEMA 
DE AHORRO PARA EL RETIRO, http://www.consar.gob.mx/ingles/ingles.shtml (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2010) (explaining, in English, how the Mexican system of social security works) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 26. EXPERIENCES ABROAD, supra note 21, at 64. 
 27. See Gustavo Merino, Deputy Minister of Soc. & Human Dev., Mex., Social Policy 
and Job Creation in Mexico, Policy Forum:  Creating More and Better Jobs, OCDE-World 
Bank 4 (May 7, 2008) (unpublished presentation), available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/ 
12/40600614.ppt (last visited Mar. 8, 2010) (discussing the implications of insufficient job 
creation in the formal Mexican labor market) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal 
of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 28. Id. 
 29. EXPERIENCES ABROAD, supra note 21, at 63. 
 30. See U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN. OFFICE OF RET. & DISABILITY POL’Y, SOCIAL SECURITY 
PROGRAMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD:  THE AMERICAS, MEXICO (2007) [hereinafter 
PROGRAMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD], www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/prog/desc/ssptw/2006-
2007/americas/mexico.pdf (examining the Mexican social security system in-depth). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See EXPERIENCES ABROAD, supra note 21, at 71 (discussing the possible future 
costs of the privatization of the Mexican Social Security System). 
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system may opt to receive benefits under that system, which entitles a 
worker to a percentage of his nominal wage for the last five years.34  A 
worker will chose to opt for the old system if the return on his or her current 
pension is lower than the amount payable under the old system.35  If private 
investments made by the new system consistently yield low returns, 
withdrawals will be higher than contributions, causing depletion of the 
fund’s assets.36  This is more of a transitory cost because once individuals 
that made contributions under the old system have all retired, retirees that 
only paid into the private systems will only be entitled to benefits under that 
system.37 
3.  Entitlement 
The age of retirement is sixty-five and the vesting period is 1,250 
weeks (approximately twenty-four years).38  The 1,250 weeks vesting 
period entitles the worker to a guaranteed minimum pension, if the worker’s 
savings are less than the guaranteed minimum pension.39  The guaranteed 
minimum pension is equal to Mexico City’s minimum wage.40  If, however, 
a worker reaches sixty-five, but has not met the vesting requirements, he 
may withdraw the total balance as a lump sum.41  Such a withdrawal 
disqualifies the worker from receipt of the guaranteed minimum pension.42  
Also, as mentioned above, workers that contributed to the old system may 
opt to receive benefits under that system.43  For most workers, the system 
will yield benefits that are only equal to their contributions plus interest.44 
                                                                                                                 
 34. See id. at 67–68 (discussing transitory costs of Mexico going from public to a 
private social security). 
 35. See id. at 65 (discussing the choices available to workers, based on their 
accumulated balances in individual accounts). 
 36. Id. at 71. 
 37. See id. at 66 (discussing transitory costs involved in Mexico transitioning from a 
public to a private social security). 
 38. See EXPERIENCES ABROAD, supra note 22, at 38 (dividing 1,250 weeks by 52 
weeks in a year, which equals 24.0385). 
 39. Id. at 65–66. 
 40. See id. (discussing withdrawal of benefits under the post-1997 Mexican Social 
Security System). 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. 
 43. EXPERIENCES ABROAD, supra note 22, at 65. 
 44. See Petition from Daniel J. O’Connell et al., Chairman, The Senior Citizens 
League, to The Presidential Transition Team, In re:  Social Security and Immigration 
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C.  Totalization Agreements 
1.  Purpose 
Workers that work in a foreign country may be subject to social 
security taxes in that foreign country.  This leads to two possible problems.  
Firstly, the worker may be subject to social security tax in both the country 
they are from and the country they are currently working in, leading to a 
"double-tax."45  Secondly, if the worker pays social security taxes in the 
foreign country, but leaves that country without meeting the vesting 
requirements of its social security system, they will have paid into a system 
that they derive no benefit from.  In some cases, the worker may not even 
know where he plans on retiring, so he may end up paying into the social 
security systems of two countries, but fail to meet the vesting requirements 
in either country.  In a global economy with increased mobility of labor, the 
frequency of these situations has increased.46 
In order to remedy some of these issues, many countries have entered 
into Social Security Tax Agreements (SSTAs).47  The Unites States 
currently has totalization agreements with twenty-four countries.48  These 
agreements have three purposes.  Firstly, they are intended to eliminate dual 
                                                                                                                 
Reform Measures, TSCL Petition in Support of Social Security Protection, and in 
Opposition to Bush Administration’s United States-Mexico Totalization Agreement 14 (Dec. 
17, 2008) (discussing some of the differences between the U.S. and Mexican systems); see 
also PROGRAMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, supra note 30 (describing entitlement benefits 
that pay into the Mexican Social Security System). 
 45. See, e.g., Gordon Klepper, Restricted Stock Units:  The Practical Alternative in 
Equity Compensation for the U.S. Multinational Employer, 13 INT’L HUM. RESOURCES J. 2 
(2004) (discussing the very real potential for mobile employees to face a double-tax 
situation). 
 46. See, e.g., OECD OBSERVER, OECD IN FIGURES 2009 (OECD et al. eds., 2009), 
available at browse.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/browseit/0109061E.pdf (including 
statistics on immigrant labor by country). 
 47. See Social Security Treaties Avoiding Dual Social Security Taxation, 
FOREIGNBORN, http://www.foreignborn.com/self-help/social_sec/8treaties.htm (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2010) (explaining the concept of dual taxation for social security purposes and the 
agreements the United States has with other countries to mitigate that issue) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 48. See U.S. International Social Security Agreements, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/international/agreements_overview.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2009), 
(listing the countries the United States currently has SSTAs with as Italy, Germany, 
Switzerland, Belgium, Norway, Canada, United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain, France, Portugal, 
the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Greece, South Korea, Republic of 
Chile, Australia, Japan, Denmark, the Czech Republic, and Poland) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).  
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social security coverage and taxation.49  Secondly, SSTAs are supposed to 
prevent the preclusion of benefits to workers that have divided their careers 
between two countries.50  Finally, SSTAs promote the proliferation of 
"benefit portability."51 
Policy reasons for SSTAs include equity and fluidity in the 
international labor market.52  Totalization agreements provide a more 
equitable outcome because they increase the likelihood that an individual 
will benefit from the contributions he makes to a social security system.53  
SSTAs also promote fluidity in the international labor market because 
fewer workers seeking to work in a different country will be faced with the 
extra impediment of the prospect of double social security taxes and/or a 
negative impact on social security entitlement. 
2.  How Totalization Agreements Work 
a.  Totalization Agreements Are Executive Agreements, Distinct from 
Treaties 
Treaties are international agreements, which, under the U.S. 
Constitution, must be signed by the President and ratified by the advice and 
consent of two-thirds of the Senate.54  Under the Constitution, this is not the 
only means by which the President can bind the United States 
internationally.  The President may also bind the United States by an 
executive agreement.55  Executive agreements require only majority 
                                                                                                                 
 49. See HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 107.3, available at http://www.ssa.gov/ 
OPHome/handbook/handbook.01/handbook-0107.html (discussing the purposes of SSTAs). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See, e.g., Eds. of the HR Series:  Policies & Practices, Compensating Expatriates 
and Third-Country Nationals, 14 INT’L HUM. RESOURCES J. 5 (2005) (discussing some of the 
general principles driving the creation of agreements like an SSTA). 
 53. See U.S. International Social Security Agreements, supra note 48 (providing as 
one reason for an SSTA:  "the agreements help fill gaps in benefit protection for workers 
who have divided their careers between the United States and another country") (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 54. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("He shall have Power, by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur."). 
 55. See FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, CHAPTER 700 TREATIES AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 721.2(b) (1985), available at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/ 
rls/rpts/175/1319.htm (describing the three ways, other than a two-thirds Senate vote, by 
which international agreements may be made). 
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approval of Congress, rather than a super majority of the Senate, as required 
by treaties.56  The President’s constitutional authority to conclude an 
executive agreement is derived from other treaties, legislation, and that 
underlying constitutional authority.57  Congress has pre-authorized the 
President’s authority to enter into totalization agreements pursuant to the 
Social Security Act: 
[The] President is authorized to enter into agreements establishing 
totalization arrangements between the social security system established 
by this title and the social security system of any foreign country, for the 
purposes of establishing entitlement to and the amount of old-age, 
survivors, disability, or derivative benefits based on a combination of an 
individual’s periods of coverage under the social security system 
established by this title and the social security system of such foreign 
country.58 
An SSTA, like a treaty, is not binding until its conditions are satisfied 
and both contracting parties ratify it.59 
b.  How They Address Dual Contributions 
Totalization agreements eliminate dual contributions by exempting a 
worker from having to contribute to one of the two systems to which they 
would otherwise have to contribute.60   Collection authority of contributions 
is based on source, meaning that the country where the worker is employed 
has the primary right to tax.61  So, as a default rule, a resident of a foreign 
country who is working in the United States would contribute to the U.S. 
social security system and a U.S. resident who is working in a foreign 
country would contribute to that country’s social security system.62 
SSTAs do, however, provide exceptions to the source rule.  One such 
exception is the temporary worker exception.63  Under this exception, a 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. 42 U.S.C.A. § 433(a) (West 1994). 
 59. See Allison Christians, Taxing the Global Worker:  Three Spheres of International 
Social Security Coordination, 26 VA. TAX REV. 81, 86 (2006) (discussing the distinctions 
between treaties and executive agreements). 
 60. See id. at 94 (discussing contributions to social security when an individual is 
working in a foreign country that has an SSTA with his home country). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 96. 
 63.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1913(b)(4) (2006) 
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worker who is working temporarily may be exempt from paying into the 
social security system of the host country for up to five years.64  
Absence of such an exception would mean that a worker working only 
temporarily in the host country would still be subject to social security 
contributions in the host country.  The temporary worker exception 
illustrates that without an SSTA in place, workers may be subject to 
social security contributions, even if they are only working temporarily 
in the host country and have no desire to remain within the country after 
retirement.  This has been a source of controversy for many temporary 
workers in the United States.65 
c.  Avoidance of Situations in Which Workers Do Not Get Benefits Because 
They Have Divided Their Career Between Two Countries 
SSTAs generally allow workers to combine periods in which they 
made contributions to more than one country, for purposes of vesting.66  
Under a totalization agreement, such workers may qualify for partial 
United States or foreign benefits based on combined work credits from 
both countries.67   The individual must have at least six quarters of 
coverage under the U.S. social security system and some coverage 
under the foreign system.68  If the individual seeks retirement benefits 
in the United States, credit accumulated in a foreign country is not 
directly transferred to the U.S. system.69  The credits, however, will be 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Id.; see also Christians, supra note 59, at 96 (discussing the "temporary" 
exception). 
 65. For example, there is no totalization agreement between India and the United 
States—Indian workers that work in the United States temporarily (maximum of six years) 
on H1B Visas are subject to social security taxes in the United States even though they will 
not meet the vesting requirement and do not gain any benefit from the contributions they 
make.  See Indo-Asian News Serv., India May Get Social Security Money on Return from 
U.S., SILICONINDIA, Dec. 4, 2006, http://www.siliconindia.com/shownews/Indians_may_get 
_social_security_money_on_return_from_US-nid-34176.html (considering the possibility of 
refunding social security payments to Indians temporarily in the United States) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); see also N. Vidyasagar, 
India to Push for ‘Totalisation’ Pact with U.S., TIMES OF INDIA, Aug. 10, 2001 (discussing 
the possibility of the United States and India entering into an SSTA). 
 66. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 433(c)(1)(A) (West 2008) (detailing the requirements necessary 
to allow workers to combine their periods of work for the purpose of social security). 
 67. See generally EXPERIENCES ABROAD, supra note 21 (examining a select portion of 
countries with social security systems different from the United States’ system). 
 68. 42 U.S.C.A. § 433(c)(1)(A) (West 2008). 
 69. See Christians, supra note 59, at 104 ("Credits are not transferred from the foreign 
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used to meet the forty quarters required to receive coverage in the 
United States.70  Consequently, the individual will only receive 
benefits for the time when income was earned and contributions were 
made in the United States.71 
There is a common misconception that individuals are permitted 
to bring over credit from a foreign jurisdiction under an SSTA and 
receive benefits based on that credit here in the United States72  
However, foreign credit may only be used to meet the forty quarters 
vesting requirement for eligibility.73  The sum of benefits received will 
be proportional to contributions made in the United States, not full 
benefits.74  The foreign jurisdiction may also provide the individual 
benefits based on credit that the individual accumulated in the foreign 
jurisdiction.75  Additionally, benefits are only combined if the 
individual would not otherwise be covered under either system.76  
Moreover, if an individual qualifies for full benefits in both countries, 
U.S. benefits may even be reduced by the amount of foreign benefits 
received.77  This is significant because a totalization agreement may 
lead to reduced benefit payments to an individual who otherwise would 
qualify for full benefits in the United States.78 
                                                                                                                 
country to the United States, but remain on record in the foreign country, where the worker 
may also receive a partial benefit."). 
 70.  Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See id. at 103 (explaining that only under certain circumstances are foreign credits 
allowed to be transferred or combined, such as when an individual would not have enough 
credits to qualify for benefits under one system). 
 73. 42 U.S.C.A. § 433(c)(1)(A) (West 2008). 
 74. 42 U.S.C.A. § 433(c)(1)(C) (West 2008). 
 75. See, e.g., Social Security Tax Information for Foreign Scholars, Workers, and 
Exchange Visitors, UNIV. CORP. FOR ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH, http://www.fin.ucar. 
edu/hr/visitors/manual/taxinfo2.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2010) ("That is, a foreign 
individual may be entitled to a foreign tax credit for the U.S. FICA tax under the income tax 
laws of his/her home country.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
and Social Justice). 
 76. See generally Georgiou v. Apfel, No. 99-1886, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 29118 (8th 
Cir. 2000) (holding that a retiree, because he qualified for benefits under the U.S. system, 
was not eligible to have his work credits from the United States and Greece combined). 
 77. See Christians, supra note 69, at 104 (citing Vanlerberghe v. Apfel, 82 F. Supp. 2d 
1212, 1215 (D. Kan. 2000)) (discussing benefit eligibility and the combination of benefits). 
 78. Id. 
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II.  U.S.-Mexico SSTA:  Unique Challenges and Possible Solutions 
SSTAs serve a worthwhile, if not essential, purpose in today’s global 
economy.79  But they are not free from problems.  Because an SSTA’s 
application is largely determined by the existing social security and 
immigration laws that make up the framework of totalization agreements, 
gaps in those laws can lead to abuse.80  It is without question that the 
proximity and immigration patterns of the contracting parties present 
unique challenges.  In the case of a possible SSTA between the United 
States and Mexico, for example, illegal immigration from Mexico to the 
United States, lack of coverage of Mexican workers under the Mexican 
social security system, and ensuring the sufficiency of document 
verification systems are significant obstacles.81  Reforming general social 
security entitlement, SSTA law, and prudent bargaining can overcome these 
obstacles.82  
A.  Potentially Leaving the System Open to Having Now-Legal Immigrants 
More Easily Claim Benefits for Time When They Were Working in the 
United States Without Authorization 
1.  The Problem 
The number of unauthorized Mexican workers within the United 
States has caused many to be apprehensive about the United States entering 
into an SSTA with Mexico.83  Estimating the illegal immigrant population 
in the United States is difficult.  Nonetheless, many private interest groups 
                                                                                                                 
 79. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing the purposes of totalization agreements). 
 80. See supra Part I.A.1 (outlining the legislative framework from which totalization 
agreements draw their basic structure). 
 81. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, PROPOSED TOTALIZATION AGREEMENT WITH MEXICO 
PRESENTS UNIQUE CHALLENGES 10 (Sept. 2003) [hereinafter UNIQUE CHALLENGES] (listing 
some of the issues faced in the case of an SSTA between the United States and Mexico). 
 82. See infra, Part II.A.2 (discussing in more detail these possible solutions). 
 83. See UNIQUE CHALLENGES, supra note 81 (discussing the uncertainty of the cost of 
an SSTA with Mexico because of the large population of undocumented workers in the 
United States); see also Trea Senior Citizens League, To the United States Congress:  A 
Petition for Redress of Grievances Concerning a Proposed Social Security Totalization 
Agreement Between the United States and Mexico, THE SENIOR CITIZENS LEAGUE, Jan. 5, 
2006 [hereinafter Petition], http://www.tscl.org/NewContent/102618.asp (voicing some of 
the concerns felt by petitioners in relation to a possible SSTA with Mexico) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
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and governmental agencies have attempted to estimate the number of 
unauthorized immigrants within the United States 84  The estimates clearly 
indicate that the numbers are increasing over the long run.85  Recent studies 
specify that approximately 11.8 million illegal immigrants are living in the 
United States.86  More than half of illegal immigrants come from 
neighbouring Mexico,87 making totalization with Mexico especially 
controversial. 
A common misconception is that SSTAs change existing immigration 
law and bestow social security benefits on illegal immigrants.88  
Totalization agreements deal with international benefit contribution, which 
is a narrow subset of social security law.  They do not deal with 
immigration law.89  Although there may be indirect consequences to illegal 
immigrants as a result of SSTAs, these agreements do not directly change 
the rights of illegal immigrants.90 
Under current social security law, "no monthly [social security] 
benefit . . . shall be payable to any alien in the United States for any month 
during which such alien is not lawfully present in the United States . . . ."91  
Similarly, under current immigration law, "an alien who is not a qualified 
alien . . . is not eligible for any Federal public benefit."92  This includes 
                                                                                                                 
 84. See Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rythina, & Bryan C. Baker, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United 
States:  January 2007, POPULATION ESTIMATES DHS (Sept. 2008) (stating that "an estimated 
11.8 million unauthorized immigrants were living in the United States in January 2007 
compared to 8.5 million in 2000 . . . [t]he annual average net increase in the unauthorized 
population during this 7-year period was 470,000"). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.; see also Jeffrey S. Passel, Estimates of the Size and Characteristics of the 
Undocumented Population, PEW HISPANIC CTR., 1 (Mar. 21, 2005), available at 
pewhispanic.org/files/reports/44.pdf (giving estimated statistics on numbers of illegal 
Mexican immigrants in the United States). 
 87. Passel, supra note 86, at 1. 
 88. See, e.g., Petition, supra note 83 (voicing concerns about the impact a U.S.–
Mexico SSTA will have on Social Security and its related Trust Funds). 
 89. See SSN High-Risk Issues:  Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Soc. Sec., 106th 
Cong. (2006) (statement of Martin H. Gerry, Deputy Comm’r, Disability & Income Sec. 
Programs, Soc. Sec. Admin.) (dispelling common misconceptions about SSTAs). 
 90. See id. ("Another common misconception is that totalization agreements allow 
SSA to pay Social Security benefits to undocumented or illegal aliens.  In reality, totalization 
agreements cannot change U.S. law except for the three narrow areas . . . and . . . have no 
effect on the prohibition against payment of benefits to illegal aliens."). 
 91. 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(y) (West 2004). 
 92. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1611(a) (West 1998) (defining a "qualified alien"). 
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social security benefits.93  Thus, illegal immigrants that pay into the social 
security system and never attain legal status do not have any hope of 
benefiting from the contributions they make. 
However, illegal immigrants that later attain legal status may be 
permitted to receive benefit for their prior contributions, which were made 
while they were not authorized to work in the United States.94  If all the 
standard criteria for U.S. citizens claiming social security benefits are met,95 
an individual who is not a U.S. citizen or national may qualify for social 
security benefits by receiving credit for the time he or she was an illegal 
immigrant.96  Immigrants are granted access to benefits "at such time as 
their status is so changed as to make it lawful for them to engage in such 
employment . . . ."97  Earnings accrued while working illegally may be used 
to determine benefit eligibility when legal status is obtained.98 
If the United States enters into an SSTA with Mexico, the fear is that 
former illegal immigrants that are now legally working in the United States 
will also be able to have the time they worked illegally totalized, allowing 
them to more easily claim social security benefits.99  The time an 
unauthorized worker is employed in the United States can be used to help 
meet vesting requirements when the worker attains legal status.100  If the 
vesting requirement of forty quarters is met by illegal or legal employment 
in the United States the immigrant is entitled to full social security 
benefits.101  This is true regardless of whether an SSTA is in place.  An 
SSTA would, however, allow such a person to receive credit for illegal and 
legal employment in the United States even if he or she did not meet the 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Id. at § 1611(c)(1)(B). 
 94. 42 U.S.C.A. § 414(c)(1) (West 2004). 
 95. See supra Part I.A.3 (listing standard criteria for obtaining social security 
benefits). 
 96. 42 U.S.C.A. § 414(c)(1) (West 2004). 
 97. 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(c)(2)(B)(i)(I) (West 2008). 
 98. See S. REP. NO. 108-176, at 23 (2003), available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
pkg/CRPT_108srpt176/pdf/CRPT-108srpt176.pdf (stating that "individuals who begin 
working illegally and later obtain legal status could still use their illegal earnings to qualify 
for Social Security benefits"). 
 99. See id. at 24 ("Individuals who were never legally permitted to work in the United 
States should not be able to collect Social Security benefits on the basis of their illegal 
earnings."). 
 100. Id. 
 101. See UNIQUE CHALLENGES, supra note 81, at 1 (discussing the forty-hour vesting 
requirement and the possibility that an SSTA with Mexico could allow illegal aliens to 
circumvent that rule and get credit for their partial work periods). 
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forty-quarter vesting requirement.102  If the immigrant spent time working 
in a foreign jurisdiction, which had an SSTA with the United States, that 
time could be used to meet the U.S. vesting requirements.  Thus, an SSTA 
with Mexico could also allow illegal immigrants to receive partial benefits 
in the United States for time that they worked both legally and illegally. 
2.  Possible Solutions 
Reformation of social security benefit entitlement denying illegal 
immigrants any present or future benefit upon attaining legal status will 
prohibit them from obtaining social security benefits via an SSTA based on 
the time they worked illegally. The goal of prohibiting individuals from 
gaining social security credit for unauthorized work can likely be achieved 
by making any one of a number of amendments to the Social Security Act, 
although some are more extreme than others. These types of total 
prohibitions eliminate any credit for contributions made while a worker was 
unauthorized to work in the United States, even if they later attain legal 
status.  Proposed reforms include the Social Security for Americans Only 
Act103 and the No Social Security for Illegal Immigrants Act. 104  There has 
been pressure to implement such immigration reforms.105 
The Social Security for Americans Only Act amends § 415(e) of the 
Social Security Act.106  The amendment would prohibit "any wages paid to 
such individual after December 31, 2005, while such individual is not a 
citizen or national of the Unites States"107 to be counted towards social 
security entitlement.  The No Social Security for Illegal Immigrants Act 
would amend § 410 of the Social Security Act by limiting the definition of 
employment to exclude "[s]ervice performed by an alien while employed in 
the Unites States for any period during which the alien is not authorized to 
be so employed."108  The intent of both of these bills is to prevent illegal 
immigrants from receiving credit for social security benefits for the time 
they worked illegally in the United States.  Significantly for this discussion, 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Id. 
 103. Social Security for Americans Only Act of 2005, H.R. 858, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 104. No Social Security for Illegal Immigrants Act, H.R. 1438, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 105. See Petition, supra note 83 (pushing Congress to pass certain legislation which 
would prevent an SSTA with Mexico). 
 106.  Social Security for Americans Only Act of 2005, H.R. 858, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 107. Id. § 2(2)(A). 
 108. No Social Security for Illegal Immigrants Act, H.R. 1438, 109th Cong. (2005). 
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an outright prohibition on receiving credit for unauthorized work would 
eliminate any possibility that a worker who worked illegally in the United 
States would be able to circumvent social security vesting requirements by 
relying on the partial credit structure available in an SSTA. 
A second, less direct approach would be to amend the statute that pre-
authorizes the President to enter into SSTAs.109  Bill H.R. 132 was recently 
reintroduced into the House of Representatives.  H.R. 132 provides 
"[l]imitations on coverage of individuals based on earnings by individuals 
in the United States while such individuals were not citizens, nationals, or 
lawful permanent residents of the United States and were not authorized to 
be employed in the United States."110  Although this will not forestall 
workers from pooling the time they spent working illegally and legally in 
the United States for purposes of meeting Social Security’s forty-quarter 
vesting requirement, these workers will not be able to use the time they 
spent working illegally for purposes of "totalization." 
A practical consideration that is worth noting is that, although the 
current state of the law provides an opportunity for individuals now legally 
in the United States to receive social security credit for the time they 
worked illegally, it is not likely that this opportunity will be exploited.  
First, the burden is on the contributor to produce documents to substantiate 
a claim of past contributions made while an individual was unauthorized to 
work.111  It may be difficult for a worker to carry this burden.  If an 
authorized worker with a valid social security number in her own name has 
to prove prior withholdings, he or she can easily submit a W-2 that has his 
or her name and social security number on it.  If, however, a worker has to 
prove that he or she was working without authorization in the past by using 
a stolen or fraudulent social security number, he or she will have to prove 
that it was in fact himself or herself, and not someone else, working and 
paying withholdings tax with that false or fraudulent social security 
number.  Second, even if the worker was able to carry the burden of 
substantiating his or her contributions, he or she may refrain from claiming 
benefit entitlement based on this information out of fear of being penalized 
for working without authorization.112  Given these realities, illegal-turned-
                                                                                                                 
 109. 42 U.S.C.A. § 433(a) (West 1994). 
 110. Total Overhaul of Totalization Agreements Law of 2009, H.R. 132, 111th Cong. 
§ 3 (2009). 
 111. See Francine Lipman, Francine Lipman on Social Security Benefits for 
Immigrants, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 1114, 1116 (LexisNexis 2007) (discussing who is 
entitled to social security benefits and restrictions on payments of earned entitlement).  
 112. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1325(a) (West 1991) (describing the penalties for illegal 
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legal immigrants may never use this apparent gap in the system to their 
advantage. 
B.  The Need for Increased Coverage of Mexican Workers Domestically 
1.  The Problem 
National social security systems differ from one country to the next.  
Differences include:  the scope of coverage, the segment of the population 
that is entitled to coverage, and the resources of the system.113  Yet the 
regulations applicable to U.S. SSTAs, while recognizing the inevitability of 
variation also demand a degree of approximation Section 433 of Title 42 of 
the United States Code states that "agreements may only be negotiated with 
foreign countries that have a social security system of general application in 
effect.  The system shall be considered to be in effect if it is collecting 
social security taxes or paying social security benefits."114  This regulation 
demonstrates that the other contracting country must have a general social 
security system in place in order for an SSTA to be negotiated.  To date, all 
of the totalization agreements that have been concluded with the United 
States have been with countries that have comparable programs.115 
The importance of the two countries having comparable systems is 
underscored by the following situation:  a contracting party that does not 
collect social security taxes from a large subset of its population who is also 
exempted under an SSTA from paying taxes in the host country because he 
or she is a temporary worker, will avoid paying social security taxes 
altogether and not be entitled to coverage.  This undermines one of the 
central purposes of social security totalization:  preventing preclusion of 
social security benefits to workers that split their careers between two 
countries.116 
Lack of domestic coverage coupled with the existence of an SSTA 
would also put American workers at a comparative disadvantage because 
employers in the United States, holding all else equal, would be able to pay 
                                                                                                                 
immigration; penalties include fines and up to six months in prison). 
 113. See EXPERIENCES ABROAD, supra note 21 (examining different countries’ social 
security systems). 
 114. Negotiating Totalization Agreements, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1903 (1994). 
 115. See U.S. International Social Security Agreements, supra note 48 (listing the 
countries with which the United States has SSTAs). 
 116. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing the purposes of SSTAs). 
622 16 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 603 (2010) 
these foreign workers less because their gross income would not be reduced 
by social security taxes. The temporary foreign workers would not pay 
social security taxes to their country of origin because their country of 
origin does not require them to pay such taxes or it does require them to pay 
such taxes but has a weak enforcement mechanism.  Also, the temporary 
foreign workers would not pay social security taxes in the United States if 
an SSTA is in place between their country of origin and the United States 
because of the temporary worker exception.117  The amount of deductions 
of gross income would be lower so these temporary foreign workers 
actually would take home more of their salary.  U.S. companies that hire 
these workers could pay them less than domestic workers who do pay social 
security taxes because of the decreased deductions.  This is undesirable for 
U.S. workers because they will have to either accept lower wages or risk 
being priced out of the market.  It is also bad for foreign workers because 
they will not have social security retirement benefits when they retire.118 
Mexico’s system appears to meet the minimum requirements of the 
regulation, which requires a contracting country to an SSTA with the 
United States to have a social security system that collects social security 
contributions and pays benefits.119  However, a limited percentage of the 
population is covered under the Mexican system and there is a discrepancy 
between benefits received by contributors in the two countries.120  These 
realities make negotiating an SSTA between the United States and Mexico 
increasingly challenging. 
2.  Possible Solution 
The United States may be able to use the prospect of a totalization 
agreement with Mexico to incentivize improvements in Mexico’s benefits 
entitlement and benefits payments.  Another country that is eager to enter 
into an SSTA with the Unites States is India.121  India has a large population 
of high-skilled workers that travel to the United States and work there 
                                                                                                                 
 117. See supra Part I.C.2.b (discussing dual contributions). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See supra Part I.B (providing an overview of the Mexican Social Security 
System). 
 120. See Merino, supra note 27, at 4 ("58% of the population lacks coverage through 
the social security institutions."). 
 121. See N. Vidyasagar, supra note 65 (noting India’s push for a "totalisation" 
agreement with the United States.) 
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temporarily.122  Being temporary workers and having no totalization 
agreement between the United States and the foreign country that the 
workers are from means that the workers are subject to social security 
taxation, but they do not receive credit for their temporary employment.123  
Given this situation, it is not surprising that India has been putting pressure 
on the United States to enter into an SSTA. 
An initial roadblock was that India did not meet the requirement of 
having a social security system that collected social security taxes and paid 
benefits.124  Coverage in India historically has been limited to very poor 
individuals and only a certain number of individuals per household.125  
Since talks of a U.S.-Indian SSTA commenced, India has made substantial 
strides in their social security policy.126  It has extended coverage for all 
citizens that are over 65 and below the poverty line.127  It has also lifted 
restriction on the number of individuals entitled to coverage in a single 
household.128  Although the reforms to India’s social security system may 
not all be attributed to its desire to enter into a totalization agreement with 
the United States, it is evident that the prospect of such an agreement with 
the United States was a factor in India’s decision to make these reforms. 
The Indian example reveals that the prospect of entering into an SSTA 
with the United States may motivate a country to make changes 
domestically that will increase the likelihood of an agreement being 
reached.  The incentive of a totalization agreement with the United States 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN. OFFICE OF POL’Y, SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS 
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD:  ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, 2006 INDIA, www.ssa.gov/policy/ 
docs/progdesc/ssptw/2006-2007/asia/india.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2010) (providing the 
coverage available under the Indian Social Security System in 2006). 
 126. See U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN. OFFICE OF POL’Y, INTERNATIONAL UPDATE:  RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN FOREIGN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PENSIONS 126 (November 2007), available 
at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/intl_update/2007-11/2007-11.pdf 
(providing updates on the Indian Social Security System). 
 127. See Old Age Pension for All Elderly Poor, HINDU BUS. LINE, Oct. 1, 2007, 
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2007/10/02/stories/2007100252361000.htm (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2010) (discussing reform to India’s Social Security System that extends 
coverage to all poor citizens) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
and Social Justice); see also Government Announces Pension for Elderly BPL Citizens, THE 
HINDU, Sept. 14, 2007 (discussing Indian government’s announcement to extend old age 
pension payments to all people below poverty line and over sixty-five).  
 128. See N. Vidyasagar, supra note 65 (noting that entitlement to benefits would be 
easier to obtain). 
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may promote changes in the Mexican social security system that will 
increase the portion of the population that receives retirement benefits and 
increase the return on contributions made by workers in Mexico.  These 
reforms will not only make a totalization agreement with Mexico more 
appealing for the United States, they will also improve Mexico’s system 
and increase benefits entitlement to a greater number of Mexican workers. 
C.  Strengthening Data Verification Systems 
1.  The Problem 
When two countries enter into an SSTA, they, to some extent, have to 
rely on the other country’s data verification systems for measuring benefit 
entitlement.129  Important information includes birth, death, earnings and 
other eligibility data.  Under some existing SSTAs that the United States is 
a party to, the contracting countries have agreed to depend on each other’s 
verification systems.130  This eliminates the need for double verification and 
reduces costs.131  It also, however, subjects the contracting countries to 
exclusive reliance on each others’ data verification efforts, increasing the 
possibility of abuse.132 
In the past, when data has been verified by the United States, it has 
been done through informal means.133  Routine computer matches 
performed to check the eligibility status of domestic beneficiaries are not 
performed on foreign beneficiaries due to lack of capacity.134  Instead, the 
United States primarily relies on periodic surveys and personal 
questionnaires that are conducted in the foreign country that has an 
                                                                                                                 
 129. See supra Part II (discussing possible negative effects of SSTAs). 
 130. See Testimony Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means Subcomm. on Soc. Sec., 
109th Cong. (Mar. 2, 2006) (testimony of Martin H. Gerry, Deputy Comm’r for Disability 
and Income Sec. Programs), available at http://www.ssa.gov/legislation/testimony_ 
030206.html (discussing the integrity of foreign data in totalization agreements) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, A MORE FORMAL APPROACH COULD 
ENHANCE SSA’S ABILITY TO DEVELOP AND MANAGE TOTALIZATION AGREEMENTS, GAO-05-
250, 5–6, 9–11 (Feb. 2005) [hereinafter A MORE FORMAL APPROACH], available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05250.pdf (discussing how SSTAs are developed and the 
need for a more formal approach going forward). 
 134. Id. at 14. 
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agreement with the United States 135  Depending on the country, surveys are 
conducted as frequently as once every five years and as infrequently as 
once every thirty years.136  Surveys are performed by SSA staff; they visit 
the homes of foreign beneficiaries to verify eligibility and identity.137  
Personal questionnaires are sent out every two years and the onus is on the 
foreign beneficiaries to accurately self-report.138  In the past, the SSA has 
also trained foreign social security employees to be more vigilant in 
verifying documentation.139 
Concluding a totalization agreement with Mexico will require an 
increased emphasis on data reliability,140 the SSA has reported that 
Mexico’s social security reporting policies and controls are adequate.141  
After reviewing a selected sample of actual Mexican documents, the SSA 
also concluded that most documents were reliable.142  Even if Mexico 
currently has document verification systems that are on par with countries 
that the United States already has SSTAs with, the high immigration levels 
from Mexico to the United States raise the stakes in this context, increasing 
the importance of document accuracy.  The current emphasis on informal 
document verification and reliance on the other party’s verification system 
may lead to costly errors.  Improvements in the United States’ ability to 
independently verify data of Mexican beneficiaries may, however, lead to 
the United States bearing the financial burden of such improvements. 
2.  Possible Solution 
The United States can add provisions into an SSTA requiring Mexico 
to improve its domestic social security system’s data verification system.  
This approach is analogous to the adoption and ratification of the North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC, commonly 
referred to as the Environmental Side Agreement).  Prior to the adoption of 
                                                                                                                 
 135. Id. at 3, 13. 
 136. Id. at 13. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 3–4. 
 139. A MORE FORMAL APPROACH, supra note 133, at 3–4. 
 140. See Nicole A. Kersey, Misplaced Opposition:  Immigration Incentives of the 
Proposed Social Security Totalization Agreement with Mexico, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 57, 58, 
80 (2007) (stating that data verification concerns should be addressed before entering into a 
totalization agreement with Mexico). 
 141. Id. at 9–10.  
 142. Id. 
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NAFTA, there was speculation that Mexico’s weak enforcement of 
environmental regulations would put U.S. companies at a comparative 
disadvantage relative to their Mexican counterparts and would eventually 
cause them to relocate in Mexico.143  This would hurt the Mexican 
environment and the surrounding region.144  Out of this concern, the 
NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement was concluded as part of the 
NAFTA ratification process.145  One of the Environmental Side 
Agreement’s objectives is to "enhance compliance with, and enforcement 
of, environmental laws and regulations . . . ."146  To the surprise of some, 
the results have been positive; Mexico has strengthened its environmental 
protection efforts.147 
If a U.S.-Mexico totalization agreement is concluded that incorporates 
specific provisions aimed at strengthening Mexican data verification 
systems, the risk of erroneous benefit entitlement can be reduced.148  These 
provisions could target any existing weaknesses in reliability of Mexican 
data.  Improvements to Mexican data verification systems will not lead to 
an increased cost to the United States and they have the potential of 
reducing costs for erroneous benefit payments. 
A U.S.-Mexico SSTA may also include provisions that ease the United 
States’ ability to independently verify Mexican data.  Provisions that call 
for integration of United States and Mexican data storage systems will 
allow each country to independently verify the other’s data.149  The start-up 
                                                                                                                 
 143. See MARK DRUMBL ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATION:  NAFTA, 
WTO, INVESTMENT, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 100 (2008) (unpublished manuscript) 
(discussing the impetus behind the adoption of the NAFTA side agreement). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
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costs of such an initiative will likely be large.  In order to lessen the 
financial impact on a single contracting country, the costs of implementing 
such a system can she shared.  Once the system is established, maintenance 
costs will likely be low.  Considering the number of Mexicans in the United 
States, the costs of integrating data storage systems in the two countries 
may be warranted. 150 
III.  Benefits of a Totalization Agreement with Mexico 
A.   Motivation of Illegal Workers to Attain Legal Status 
Unauthorized workers with false documentation pay taxes through 
paycheck withholdings.151  Their employer, just as with legal workers, will 
withhold a portion of their earnings for federal income tax, state income 
tax, Medicare and Social Security, and, in many cases, local tax.152  
However, most illegal immigrants do not file a tax return.153  So taxes are 
withheld, but there is no prospect for these unauthorized workers to ever 
receive a corresponding benefit, unless they attain legal status at some 
point.154  Annual Social Security tax collection from illegal immigrants is 
estimated at approximately nine billion dollars.155 
Under current law, these workers will only receive credit for the time 
they were employed illegally if and when they attain legal status.156  In the 
absence of a totalization agreement, they will not be able to claim benefit 
for time they spent working in the United States, legally or illegally, unless 
they meet the forty-quarter vesting requirement.157  A U.S.-Mexico 
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totalization agreement would impact the motivations of workers who are 
illegally employed in the United States for less than the forty quarters 
needed to qualify for social security benefits.  If a totalization agreement is 
established between the United States and Mexico, these workers can 
qualify for partial benefits under the U.S. social security system by working 
a minimum of six quarters in the United States and in Mexico for the 
remainder of the U.S. vesting period, if they attain legal status at some 
point.158  This class of workers, even if they are present in the United States 
for only a short time, will have an additional motive to attain legal 
status:  the benefit for the time they work in the United States.159  Providing 
benefits for workers for time they spend illegally working in the country 
may not be the most desirable result, but it will provide workers that are 
presently working illegally for a short period of time (longer than six 
quarters) with an incentive to obtain legal status. 
A more desirable, and perhaps less controversial, result will be 
achieved after first establishing a reform that denies illegal immigrants 
social security benefits for time they worked in the United States without 
authorization, even if they later receive legal status.  By denying social 
security benefits for income received while working illegally and 
establishing an SSTA, the motivations for obtaining legal status are even 
stronger.  Currently, Mexican workers that spend part of their career in 
Mexico and part in the United States, whether authorized or unauthorized to 
work in the United States, have no hope of receiving social security benefits 
in the United States, unless they work within the United States for forty 
quarters.160  A totalization agreement that allows benefits to be received 
after a minimum of six quarters combined with a prohibition on 
unauthorized work ever counting towards social security entitlement will 
motivate unauthorized workers that work for more than six quarters to work 
legally.  An unauthorized worker that is contributing to the social security 
system will no longer see paying social security taxes as a necessary cost of 
working in the United States temporarily, but rather a cost of working 
illegally.  Under this scheme, Mexican workers that work within the United 
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States legally will be rewarded and workers that are here illegally will be 
punished. 
An individual’s working life is a finite number of years.  The more 
time an individual spends working illegally and contributing to a system 
that they will not receive any benefit from, the less working years they will 
have to make contributions that will bestow future retirement benefits upon 
them.  A totalization agreement combined with the forgoing reforms would 
motivate workers to attain legal status sooner. 
B.   Promotion of Legal Immigration 
A totalization agreement coupled with a prohibition on social security 
benefit entitlement for time spent working illegally will not only effect 
illegal workers that are currently working within the United States, it will 
also promote legal immigration from Mexico, thereby increasing long-term 
sustainability of the Social Security Trust Fund.161  With increases in life 
expectancy, low fertility rates, and the retirement of the baby-boom 
generation, having a larger number of workers contributing to the social 
security system is becoming increasingly important.162  SSTAs increase 
labor mobility between countries because workers can freely work in a 
country that has a totalization agreement with their home country without 
worrying about limiting their ability to collect social security benefits.  An 
SSTA with Mexico will encourage more Mexicans to legally work in the 
United States.  Immigrants that would otherwise have illegally immigrated 
to the United States will have more reason to pursue legal entry and work 
authorization. 
More generally, an SSTA may have some symbolic importance.  Many 
Americans share a negative sentiment towards illegal immigration.163  
Negativity is usually targeted towards illegal immigration from Mexico, but 
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there is likely some impact on legal Mexican immigrants as well.  
Currently, the United States has SSTAs with twenty-three countries.164  
Most of these countries have a relationship with the United States that is 
less substantial than the relationship Mexico has with the United States.165  
A U.S.-Mexico SSTA will send the message that the United States 
welcomes legal immigration from Mexico.  Mexicans considering working 
legally within the United States will likely feel more welcome if they are 
able to receive social security credit for time spent working on the other 
side of the border. 
C.  Economic Impact 
Under the current law, social security entitlement is available to 
individuals that now have legal status on earnings that they obtained while 
working legally or illegally.166  This could result in significant costs for the 
U.S. social security system.167  These potential costs are difficult to estimate 
because of the lack of reliable data quantifying the large number of 
undocumented workers in the United States.168  Recent studies indicate that 
approximately 11.8 million illegal immigrants are living in the United 
States.169  Estimates also indicate that more than half of illegal immigrants 
come from neighbouring Mexico.170  If even a fraction of these individuals 
claimed social security benefits under a totalization agreement, the costs 
would be staggering.  Estimates also indicate that the number of illegal 
immigrants is increasing over the long-run.171  So a totalization agreement 
that permits individuals to more easily claim benefits for the time they spent 
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working illegally could lead to a continual negative impact on the fund’s 
long-term sustainability. 
On a positive note, over a five-year time span, a totalization agreement 
with Mexico would save U.S. workers and employers approximately $140 
million in contributions to Mexico.172  Additionally, external economic 
benefits, such as increased propensity to spend, would likely result because 
of lower taxes for U.S. workers and employers.  U.S. workers in Mexico 
would have a higher disposable income, as they would only be paying 
social security taxes to one country at a time.173  This may encourage them 
to increase their spending in the United States.  A similar argument could 
be made for authorized Mexican workers within the United States who, 
because of a U.S.-Mexico SSTA, would only be paying social security 
taxes in one country.  Presumably, their disposable income would also 
increase, which could cause them to increase their spending while in the 
United States. 
If social security law is reformed, denying benefit payments to 
individuals for time spent working illegally, the costs of entering into a 
totalization agreement with Mexico will decrease and the associated 
economic benefits will likely remain the same.  This will likely lead to a net 
benefit for the Unites States.  Gains can be recognized by domestic and 
foreign workers, U.S. employers, and the economy as a whole. 
D.  Promotion of Better Relations Between NAFTA Parties and Consistency 
with Key NAFTA Principles  
The NAFTA between the United States, Canada, and Mexico came 
into force on January 1, 1994.174  It embodies the national treatment 
provision,175 the most favoured nations principle,176 and the transparency 
principle.177  These principles do not pertain to the flow of labor; NAFTA 
does not change existing labor or immigration laws dealing with the flow of 
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labor between NAFTA parties.178  However, applying these principles to 
Mexican workers in the United States strongly supports the conclusion that 
a totalization agreement with Mexico will strengthen U.S.-Mexico 
relations. 
National treatment requires that each party to the NAFTA treat other 
NAFTA parties no less favourably than it treats its own nationals, under 
like circumstances.179  Applying this concept to the entitlement of Mexicans 
that work in the United States means benefit entitlement in the United 
States based on time spent working in the United States would be equalized 
for Mexican workers that work in the United States and U.S. workers that 
work in the United States.  Under the proposed U.S.-Mexico SSTA 
A person who is or has been subject to the applicable laws of one Party 
and who resides in the territory of the other Party . . . shall receive equal 
treatment with nationals of the other Party in the implementation of the 
applicable laws of the other Party regarding entitlement to and payment 
of benefits.180   
So nationals of either Mexico or the United States will be treated equally 
when it comes to social security benefits in the United States, under a U.S.-
Mexico SSTA. 
This may appear to be inconsistent with national treatment because a 
U.S. worker that works less than forty quarters will not have his benefits 
vest,181 whereas, under an SSTA, a Mexican worker may have his benefits 
vest by working as few as six quarters in the United States.182  This, 
however, is not the case.  A Mexican worker will still only be entitled to 
benefits in the United States if he has met the forty-quarters vesting 
requirement, but, with an SSTA in place, he can use the time he worked in 
Mexico to meet the vesting requirements.183  Moreover, a U.S. worker that 
works in Mexico for part of his career may also use the time he worked in 
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Mexico to meet U.S. social security vesting requirements.184  Therefore, an 
SSTA between the United States and Mexico is consistent with the 
principle of national treatment. 
Most favoured nation treatment is somewhat aspirational.  The idea is 
you should treat NAFTA countries at least as favourably as you treat non-
NAFTA countries.185  The United States has many SSTAs with countries 
that are not parties to the NAFTA.186  Application of the most favoured 
nation principle in this context would require the United States to negotiate 
an SSTA with Mexico, as the preferential treatment that is given to some 
non-NAFTA parties, must also be given to NAFTA parties. 
The transparency principle requires information that is available in one 
NAFTA country to be made publically available in other NAFTA 
countries.187  For example, in the international trade context, information 
regarding entering into domestic industries, such as regulations, capital 
requirements, etc., must be made publically available to all NAFTA parties.  
Application of this principle in the labor context is not only consistent with 
the conclusion of a U.S.-Mexico totalization agreement, it will also promote 
United States monitoring of reforms to the Mexican social security system 
and support U.S. entitlement to information regarding Mexican data 
verification systems. 
As mentioned above, one of the unique obstacles to concluding a 
totalization agreement with Mexico is that only a limited percentage of the 
Mexican population is covered under the Mexican social security system.188  
Reforms can be made to Mexico’s social security system in order to 
increase social security coverage.  The transparency principle will assist the 
United States in obtaining information about possible reforms or policy 
changes that Mexico has made that target increasing social security 
coverage.189  Gaining insight into the Mexican system may also permit the 
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United States to assist Mexico with reforms and, when possible, draw on its 
own experience when dealing with similar problems. Additionally, the 
transparency principle will help the United States monitor Mexico’s 
progress in increasing coverage.190 
Concluding a totalization agreement with Mexico also requires 
strengthening Mexican data verification systems.191  The transparency 
principle will assist the United States in obtaining vital information 
regarding Mexico’s data verification systems.  If positive reforms to data 
verification are made, continued transparency following the conclusion of a 
totalization agreement would help ensure those reforms are not later 
weakened. 
Applying the bedrock principles of the NAFTA to the labor context 
would lead to the conclusion of a U.S.-Mexico SSTA.  This would provide 
a more unified approach to social security totalization between the United 
States and other NAFTA parties, as Canada already has a totalization 
agreement with the United States.192  It would also, undoubtedly, strengthen 
relations between the United States and Mexico.193 
E.  Facilitation of Mexican Workers’ Return Home 
Many foreign workers wish to return home after working in the United 
States.194  A totalization agreement with Mexico would encourage Mexican 
workers to return home earlier, as their benefits will be totalized.195  If a 
worker is faced with the decision of working in the United States for forty 
quarters and receiving full social security benefits or returning home prior 
to working forty quarters and receiving no retirement benefits, he will likely 
remain in the United States until his benefits vest.196  By not having an 
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SSTA with Mexico, many workers remain in the United States longer than 
they would otherwise like to in order to cash in on their retirement 
benefits.197  This inhibits the free flow of labor and, in doing so, may cause 
an unnecessary burden on the American social security system.198  If this 
impediment is removed, workers could spend as little as six quarters in the 
United States and spend the remainder of their career in Mexico, and have 
their benefits vest as long as the combined total of quarters worked in both 
countries equals forty.199  The Mexican worker would only be entitled to 
partial benefits proportional to the time he spent working in the United 
States, meaning he would receive less than full benefits in the United 
States.200  This outcome is desirable from the stand-point of a worker that 
would like to return home and a social security system that would like to 
prolong its solvency. 
If the prospect of entering into a totalization agreement with the 
United States is used as a catalyst to seek reforms in the Mexican social 
security system, eventually leading to a system in which more people are 
covered and benefit entitlement increases, it is likely that more Mexicans 
will return to Mexico and claim benefits under the Mexican system.201  
Increasing the amount of people covered under the Mexican system will 
allow workers in the informal sector that previously had no prospect of 
receiving social security benefits to make contributions and claim 
entitlement in Mexico.202  If these workers spend part of their career in the 
United States working legally, they can totalize their benefits.203  This will 
provide a strong incentive for Mexican workers to return home that, under 
the present structure, had no prospect of receiving social security benefits in 
Mexico. 
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F.  A More Equitable Result 
It is easy to argue that illegal immigrants do not deserve to receive 
social security benefits, but that argument is much harder to make about 
individuals that are authorized to work in the United States.  Unauthorized 
workers knowingly break the law.  They should not receive benefits from 
the American social security system by virtue of breaking the law.  Legal 
Mexican workers, on the other hand, go through all of the requirements to 
obtain authorization and are still not permitted to totalize their benefits.204  
They are essentially contributing to a system from which they will not 
receive any benefit, unless they remain and work in the United States for 
forty quarters.205 
Granted, Mexico is not the only country that does not have a 
totalization agreement with the United States and there are many other 
workers that do not receive benefits for the contributions they make to the 
American social security system.206  Many of those individuals, arguably, 
should receive benefits for their contributions as well.  There is, however, a 
significant difference between other countries that do not have SSTAs with 
the United States and Mexico—Mexico has consistently represented the 
birthplace of the largest number of individuals becoming legal permanent 
residents in the Unites States.207  In 2006, approximately fourteen percent of 
new legal permanent residents were born in Mexico.208  This represents a 
large number of individuals that are likely contributing to a system from 
which they may never derive any benefit.  Additionally, concluding an 
SSTA with Mexico may provide valuable lessons that will aid in the 
adoption of totalization agreements with countries that have characteristics 
that are less like the characteristics of most of the countries that the United 
States currently has an SSTA with and more like those of Mexico.  
Consequently, lessons from the U.S.-Mexico totalization experience will 
help ensure inequities that other foreign workers face by virtue of the 
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absence of a totalization agreement between the United States and their 
home country will be eliminated. 
Contributions from individuals whose benefits do not vest because of 
the absence of a totalization agreement with Mexico will increase the Social 
Security Trust Fund, but such a policy also has the prospect of many other 
negative effects on U.S.-Mexico relations.  As mentioned in this Note, there 
are other options that would result in an increase in the Fund’s long-term 
solvency and permit Mexican workers that work in the United States legally 
to benefit from contributions they have made.209 
IV.  Conclusion 
The unique challenges that an SSTA between the United States and 
Mexico would present can be overcome if the right initiatives are pursued 
by the United States.  Reformation of U.S. social security law to deny 
benefits to individuals for the time they work illegally will disallow 
unauthorized work to be used to calculate social security benefits under an 
SSTA.  The possibility of a U.S.-Mexico SSTA may be used to motivate 
Mexico to improve its social security system.  Strengthening of Mexico’s 
data verification systems and independent document verification initiatives 
may be bargained for prior to concluding an SSTA.  Resolution of these 
issues would allow many benefits to flow to the United States from an 
SSTA with Mexico. 
A U.S.-Mexico totalization agreement would motivate existing illegal 
workers to attain legal status and promote legal immigration to the United 
States from Mexico.  A U.S. worker that spends part of his career in 
Mexico could benefit from having his contributions totalized.  An SSTA 
with Mexico would also strengthen relations with Mexico by applying the 
NAFTA principles of national treatment, most favoured nations, and 
transparency in the labor context.  Additionally, an SSTA would remove 
the inducement on Mexican workers to remain in the United States until 
their retirements benefits vest.  Economic benefits would likely be realized 
by foreign and domestic workers, U.S. employers, and the economy as a 
whole.  Finally, an SSTA would lead to a more equitable result, as 
Mexicans that contribute to the U.S. social security system will more likely 
be entitled to a return on their contribution. 
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